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– III – 1 Introduction 
In economic literature the allocation of financial resources is regarded as the 
outstanding function of a financial market. The market prices from the balance of 
supply and demand determine the expected return (supply) as well as the expected 
capital costs (demand), that influence the profitability of investment projects. 
The willingness of the investors to acquire assets essentially depends on their 
maturity and on their liquidability. These on the other hand is determined largely by 
the pricing and the tradeability. Therefore, the allocative function gets essential support 
through the informational and valuation efficiency of the prices that are generated by 
the financial markets (cf. Fama 1970 as well as the discussion in Bienert 1996). The 
allocation of financial resources into the most favorable use relies on the condition that 
the market prices reflect the currently available information of the economic subjects.  
The tradeability takes shape through the concept of the liquidity. Liquidity is defined 
as the possibility to buy (or to sell) an asset immediately and anytime in large or small 
quantities without any additional charge or price increase (or reduction). So, two time 
dimensions (immediacy and market willingness) and two price dimensions (inferior 
price influence of minimum lot and block orders) are made clear besides the resiliency 
(cf. Bernstein 1987, Schmidt/Iversen 1991, Kempf 1998).  
 
Both aspects, informational efficiency and liquidity, are key factors in valuing the 
performance of financial markets (cf. e.g. Oehler 2000a). The academic research within 
the market microstructure paradigm as well as the adjustment of real market designs 
in a growing competition between international stock exchanges were enforced by the 
crucial question which organizational structure survives and outperforms the 
competitors. There are two central issues in the debate over the last two decades: the 
consequences of  computerization of the trading process (cf. e.g. Franke/Hess 2000) 
and the quality of different trading mechanisms. The latter topic is addressed in this 
paper. 
 
Figure 1 shows the principal alternatives of a market structure (see e.g. 
Schmidt/Küster Simic 2000 for an overview). 
The first criterion, the privilege to generate the market clearing price, i.e. the kind of 
matching the orders, determines two main designs: the dealer market and the auction 
market. The dealer market is shortly characterized as a market where special market 
participants, the so-called market makers, supply liquidity. Market makers have the 
– 1 – duty to continuously quote bid and ask prices, the so-called bid-ask spread. This 
provides the possibility for an immediate order execution on the quoted prices (hence, 
quote driven). The bid-ask spread compensates the market makers´ costs for inventory, 
adverse selection and others.  
 
Please insert Figure 1 around here 
 
The second criterion, the number of market makers in a dealer market, leads to the 
differentiation in a monopolistic and a multi-dealer environment. On the other hand, an 
auction market collects the orders of the investors and generates the market clearing 
price (hence, order driven) either every time if the supply and the demand fit together 
(continuous trading/auction) or only at discrete times (batch trading/auction). The 
latter alternative usually generates the market price on a level where the highest 
turnover is possible. In comparison to the continuous auction the call auction may lead 
to a better price discovery through the large number of orders that are executed at one 
time. But this advantage in informational efficiency will be compensated by the lack of 
immediacy, i.e. the time component of liquidity. 
An additional criterion, the investors´ access privilege to the price generating 
process, distinguishes between an open market without any access restriction, e.g. like 
most of the proprietary trading systems, and the agency auction where intermediaries 
control the orderflow.  
 
The two success factors, liquidity and informational efficiency, are not independent 
from each other. An informationally efficient market implies that price changes only 
occur if new information arrive which signal the change in the fundamental value of an 
asset. Therefore, these price changes are permanent.  
On the other hand, liquid markets are able to compensate price changes rapidly. The 
(ostensible) problem is solved by the argument that only temporary deviations of some 
transaction prices from the market clearing price intended by the concept. From that 
point of view, price changes potentially contain an information-induced and a liquidity-
induced component (cf. Schmidt 1970, 70-73, Amihud/Mendelson 1986 and 2000, Hu 
1997, Kempf/Uhrig 1996). 
But in the (extreme) case of rational investors in a pareto-optimal environment 
informational efficiency leads to illiquid markets because from every transaction only 
one side, the initiator, benefits from the contract (cf. Milgrom/Stockey 1982). This 
puzzle can only be solved if the assumptions are reduced. Under the (realistic) 
presumption that not all traders in the market are fully rational, noise traders, i.e. 
– 2 – investors who trade on ostensible informations, cause deviations from the (true) market 
clearing price: "What´s needed for a liquid market causes prices to be less efficient" 
(Black 1986, 532).  
 
We have to draw two conclusions from this short discussion: Under the assumption 
of real markets with noise traders a trade-off between liquidity and informational 
efficiency is more likely. First, this means that a higher degree of information 
aggregation not necessarily  leads to a higher liquidity level. Beyond this, the claim for 
an informational efficiency as high as possible is not equivalent to an optimum for the 
whole market because of costs for transaction and adverse selection (cf. 
Grossman/Stiglitz 1980). Second, it cannot necessarily be expected that one trading 
mechanism dominates all other.  
 
Having these arguments in mind we now discuss the previous research on trading 
mechanisms, both the empirical and the experimental results. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sheds some light on the previous 
research on the topic. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures 
pertaining to market environments, market institutions, information structure and 
subjects. In section 4 we develop a set of testable hypotheses that motivate the data 
analysis. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes. 
2 Related  research 
Most theoretical research on market microstructure only models one trading 
mechanism at once. Comparisons of such and statements to the superiority of 
alternatives are  rarely be found. A secondary-analytic comparison of the results of the 
research to call markets (see e.g. Mendelson 1982, Ho/Schwartz/Whitcomb 1985, 
Rustichini/Satterthwaite/Williams 1994), to continuous trading (see e.g. Friedman 
1984 and 1991, Easley/Ledyard 1993, Glosten 1994), and to dealer markets (see the 
survey by O´Hara 1995) deals with the problem of different assumptions and 
frameworks. Nevertheless, the following statements can be derived. 
The call auction shows advantages in the information processing, especially when 
the information is asymmetrically distributed among the investors. Moreover, the 
transaction costs are rather low, however, high waiting costs originated by the not-
continuous trade may attend. It can therefore be shown that investors with information 
advantages have less interest in call markets. On the other hand, the continuous 
– 3 – auction dominates especially when immediacy is a principal trade motivation. This 
conflict of interests led to the argument going back to Pagano/Röell (1992) that both 
kinds of auctions can also exist parallel. Besides the coexistence of parallel markets, 
also the solution of the integration of a call auction into a continuous auction is 
observed more frequently in the reality. It can be shown that a suitable market 
structure is created exactly when different trade motives occur (cf. Admati/Pfleiderer 
1988, Pagano/Röell 1990 und 1992). However, the coexistence or integration of both 
trading mechanisms lead among others to higher overheads and to the splitting of a 
given orderflow. 
 
The few studies that perform a comparison of market structures directly achieve 
similar results in principle, which should be addressed shortly. The model of Mendelson 
(1982 and 1987) states that especially in markets of inferior liquidity, so-called thin 
markets, the call auction is advantageous and has a weak superiority in comparison to 
a dealer market.  
In the model of Wilson (1987) it is shown that the continuous auction is in tendency 
superior also in thin markets, however with symmetrical information distribution. 
In the specific framework of a market with information privileges for some investors 
(insiders; cf. Kyle 1985) as well as generally in the models with information asymmetry 
of Pagano/Röell (1992 and 1996) it can be shown, that the call auction dominates the 
continuous trading. This is valid regarding both factors, informational efficiency and 
liquidity. However, such models use also intermediaries which are quite similar to 
market makers (cf. Madhavan 1992). 
Altogether, the advantage of the call market more clearly existing with asymmetrical 
information only proves to be ostensible if one considers that the demand for 
immediacy, i.e. the time component of liquidity, is not modeled. In the comparison 
between the two basic market structures, the dealer market and the auction market 
(see Fig. 1 No.s 1 and 2), the last-named alternative dominates in the results of the 
theoretical work. 
 
Induced through the theoretical models an extensive empirical research about topics 
of the market microstructure has established, especially to the quality of single trading 
mechanisms, from which the essential results should be presented shortly.1 
                                                
 
1  Studies are not taken into account that conduct the comparison between market 
structures very indirectly by using the decision of investors for a location or relocation, e.g. 
with a questionnaire,  because numerous further influential factors make the data very 
– 4 – One group of empirical work measures differences in the price volatility to draw 
conclusions on the advantageousness of trading mechanisms indirectly. Mostly, the two 
alternatives of auction markets, batch trading and continuous trading, are compared. 
The basic idea of this method is that risk averse investors prefer markets, whose 
organization structure leads to a low volatility. In order to solve the problem of several 
parallel influential factors the studies are conducted with two time series of the same 
market  (e.g. the open and the close prices). However, only a market microstructure-
induced effect is separated from a information-induced one, further factors are 
disregarded through the assumptions of rational behavior (see e.g.  Amihud/Mendelson 
1987, Pagano/Röell 1990, Stoll/Whaley 1990). Altogether the newer results, especially 
for the German market, show that the original interpretation of the differences found 
between the parallel time series cannot be attributed to general or specific differences of 
trading mechanisms (cf. Theissen 1998, 261). 
 
Most empirical studies were conducted concerning the success factor liquidity. 
Accordingly, the theoretical and empirical results give high evidence for the bid-ask 
spread as the most valid measure of liquidity, whereas the liqidity rate, the so-called 
market coefficient or the Roll measure (cf. Roll 1984) only cover some aspects or leads 
to diverging interpretations for different market structures (cf. Kempf 1998, Theissen 
1999). For call auctions the explicit bid-ask spread does not exist. Therefore, the 
implicit measure, defined by Friedman (1993a, 1993b), is used instead of the Roll 
measure because the latter is not valid (cf. Theissen 1999, 233).  
The implicit bid-ask spread is defined as the difference between the very best 
rejected (not executed) bid and the very best rejected ask. This concept is based on the 
consideration that a bid which is additionally reaching the market would be executed at 
exactly the price which is carried by the lowest limited and not executed ask. The same 
is valid for an additionally executed ask. "This provides an implicit measure of 
transaction costs that is valid across institutions" (Friedman 1993a, 423).  
Probably due to the measurement problems substantially more often studies on the 
comparison of the continuous auction and dealer markets are conducted (see e.g. 
Pagano/Röell 1990, Lee 1993, Schmidt/Iversen 1993, Bessembinder/Kauffmann 1996, 
Huang/Stoll 1996, Keim/Madhavan 1996, Schmidt/Oesterhelweg/Treske 1996). 
Independently from the chosen method these papers find out that the continuous 
auctions show a higher liquidity than the dealer markets.  
                                                                                                                                                
noisy (see e.g. Schiereck 1995, Schmidt/Oesterhelweg/Treske 1996) or by using  the 
revenues of the access intermediaries, e.g. broker, dealer (see e.g. Stoll 1993 und 1995). 
– 5 – The comparison between batch trading and continuous auction does not yield any 
clear results (cf. Haller/Stoll 1989, Pagano/Röell 1990, Stoll/Whaley 1990), because 
the used Roll measure is not applicable for call markets in its interpretation as 
transaction cost difference (cf. Theissen 1999, 233). The direct measurement under the 
assumption that the entire order book is known (price of an additional order) fails 
because of the non-availability of the corresponding data (cf. Mendelson 1982, 
Schmidt/Oesterhelweg/Treske 1996). Amihud/Mendelson/Lauterbach (1997) 
determine in a study on the introduction of the continuous trading on the stock 
exchange Tel Aviv that positive abnormal returns emerge that are attributed to a higher 
liquidity. Furthermore, they show an increase in the informational efficiency. 
 
Studies on the second success factor, the informational efficiency, are hardly 
available because the necessary benchmark, the fundamental or "true" value of the 
assets, cannot be observed in reality. Therefore, the indirect measurement is based on 
the analysis of parallel markets. Either the innovation of a market form is analyzed 
additionally (cf. Amihud/Mendelson/Lauterbach 1997) or earnings announcements in 
parallel but differently organized markets are examined (cf. Greene/Watts 1996). 
Whereas the first-named study states an improvement of the information processing 
after the introduction of the continuous trading, the results of the second study can be 
interpreted in the sense that a call market does better than a continuous auction in 
direct comparison with a dealer market. 
 
Overall, however, all studies suffer from the fact that clear and direct statements 
about the informational efficiency can hardly be derived because the fundamental value 
of an assets is not known in reality. Also, the empirical studies on liquidity indicate that 
the data situation of real financial markets does not allow any systematic comparison of 
the central market structures. 
The two basic problems of field studies, the not-controllable conditions and the 
lacking observableness and availability of important variables, can be overcome by the 
analysis in experimental asset markets. Here, a variation of the different market 
structures is possible. It can be traded an identical asset under different trading 
mechanisms. In addition, both the true value as well as the information structure are 
observable, i.e. the information given to and signaled from all traders. Finally, all 
transactions and further data can be documented so that the implicit bid-ask spread 
from the complete order book of a call market can be calculated, for example (see e.g. 
Duxbury 1995, Oehler 1995, Sunder 1995, Bossaerts/Plott 2000). 
– 6 – Thus, it is feasible to analyze selectively the efficiency of information processing, i.e. 
to compare the (endogenous) prices from the experimental market with the (exogenous) 
fundamental value of the asset generated by a random draw from a known distribution 
or given by the experimenter, respectively. Just as well the degree of liquidity can be 
measured in different market environments. All data are available to compute the 
explicit and the implicit spread without any problems of e.g. different transactions 
costs.2 
 
There is a growing body of studies in experimental financial market research in the 
last two decades. Starting from a basic design in the 1980s (cf. Plott/Sunder 1982) 
which is used by most of the experimenters in an auction framework, nowadays multi-
period and large-scale market experiments (cf. e.g. Bossaerts/Plott 2000 for large-scale 
markets, Smith/Suchanek/Williams 1988, van Boening/Williams/LaMaster 1993, 
Heilmann/Läger/Oehler 2000a for multi-period markets) as well as the design of dealer 
markets (cf. e.g. Friedman 1993b, Lamoureux/Schnitzlein 1996, Krahnen/Weber 1999, 
Theissen 1999) complete the experimental tools.  
Plott/Sunder design their markets as a continuous auction with a stochastic 
dividend process which leads to private values of the asset in the same period because 
all subjects are divided in two or more groups of traders which receive different payoffs. 
The endowment will be reinitialized after one or two trading periods, i.e. the holdings 
are liquidated and all investors start with a new endowment in the next period. This 
method allows to control for a special kind of learning, i.e. the amount of time the 
subjects need to reach the market equilibrium. In addition, the private valuation makes 
it feasible to measure the allocative efficiency.  
With reference to our topic, the comparison of trading mechanisms, the results of the 
experimental studies (cf. e.g. Plott/Sunder 1982 and 1988, Friedman 1993a, Schiereck 
1997) are somewhat ambiguous because of the differences in the information structure. 
                                                
 
2 A third application of experimental financial markets lies in an analysis of the 
consequences of privileges for some traders. There are two topics in this experimental 
research which both lead off to much from the focus in our paper. First, the 
improvement of market transparency like an orderbook transparency is mostly 
analyzed in one trading regime and more seldom a comparison is done (cf. e.g. 
Flood/Huisman/Koedijk/Mahieu/Röell 1997, Flood/Huisman/Koedijk/van Dijk/van 
Leeuwen 1998, Bloomfield/O´Hara 1999 and 2000 for quote disclosure (ex ante 
transparency), cf. e.g. Oehler/Unser 1998 for trade disclosure (ex post transparency)). 
Second, the endowment with information privileges like insider information or selective 
transparency only for some traders, sometimes done with a comparison of different 
market structures (cf. e.g. Friedman 1993b, Nöth/Weber 1996, Nöth 1998, 
Krahnen/Weber 1999, Heilmann/Läger/Oehler 2000a for insider trading, cf. e.g. 
– 7 – But the findings show the tendency that in the case of higher degrees of informational 
asymmetry the call market creates a better informational efficiency and higher liquidity 
than the continuous auction. 
For real asset markets the assumption of stationary replication, i.e. the 
reinitialization at every period, seems to be unsuitable (cf. Theissen 1998, 166). A 
dynamic portfolio adjustment and an endogenous expectation formation on the prices 
are not possible. Beyond it, the advantage that the replication of periods with the same 
subjects lower the research costs is quite ostensible because the trading periods are not 
(statistically) independent (cf. Friedman 1993a, Theissen 1999). So, it is necessary to 
conduct more experiments in order to generate enough data points (cf. Oehler/Unser 
1998).  
As a consequence, multi-period designs are developed which contain long-living 
assets and which provide investors with common-value assets. In comparison to the 
former framework the drawback that the trading motivation by the private dividend 
payoffs vanishes, is compensated by the fact that, like in real markets that "only" the 
heterogenity of risk aversion (cf. Unser 2000) in relation to the endowment trigger 
orders (portfolio changes). The experimental results of the studies which use the more 
realistic framework (cf. Smith/Suchanek/Williams 1988, van 
Boening/Williams/LaMaster 1993) show the tendency that the continuous auction 
dominates the call auction concerning to informational efficiency and liquidity.3 
In addition, the above cited studies which compare dealer markets with continuous 
auctions generate no unambiguous results. Whereas the findings from a private-value 
design by Friedman (1993b) demonstrate that dealer markets have lower informational 
efficiency and liquidity, the results from a common-value design by Krahnen/Weber 
(1999) and Theissen (1999) with heterogenous information in the sequel, i.e. all traders 
receive signals of identical ex ante quality and different ex post realization, show a weak 
superiority of dealer markets. But the results from the different market maker designs 
in Krahnen/Weber are somewhat inconsistent and not fully explainable (Theissen 1998, 
288). 
 
Summing up the discussion of the previous research there is a quite clear tendency 
that in environments with information symmetry continuous trading (No. 2ab in Fig. 1) 
                                                                                                                                                
Friedman 1993b, Syha 1999, Gerke/Bienert/Syha 2001 for selective orderbook 
transparency). 
3 The contradictory result from Schnitzlein (1996) lacks on some methodological 
problems because he e.g. measures liquidity in a not appropriate way (cf. Theissen 
1999, 235). 
– 8 – is superior to batch trading (No. 2aa) and the latter dominates dealer markets (No. 1a or 
1b) regarding informational efficiency and liquidity.  
Under asymmetrically distributed information, the results are not unambiguous. 
Whereas most studies can show a dominance of auction markets markets over dealer 
markets, no order can be found for the two alternatives of the call market and the 
continuous trading.  
 
The following experimental analysis therefore should provide a clarification. The 
focus of the study lies on a symmetrical information framework with heterogeneous risk 
attitudes of the investors. 
3 Experimental  design 
In our experiments investors trade long-living stocks, i.e. the stocks are not 
liquidated at the end of a trading period. The market prices were determined by the 
trading actions of the subjects but the fundamental information structure about the 
stocks was generated by a binomial process described in more detail below. As known 
by the investors the true or fundamental value of a stock is used for the incentive 
procedure (payment) at the end of each experimental session. 
3.1  Information structure, subjects, and procedures 
The fundamental value of the traded stocks follows a binomial process with a 
positive drift. This can be fully described by five parameters: 
•  Start value v , the fundamental value of the first period.  1
•  Probability   for an upward movement in the next period.  p
•  Probability   for a downward movement in the next period.  1 q = − p
                                              
•  Increment u  of an upward step. 
•  Increment d  of a downward step. Both increments were of equal size. 
Before the experiments were started, the values of the parameters were fixed and 
valid for all experiments.4 In the following, the construction of the binomial process 
 
4 In the call market experiments, the path of the realized fundamental values was 
identical in all 6 experiments (parallel sessions). This was not possible for the continuous 
trading and dealer market experiments, where we used a set of five and six different paths, 
respectively. It is unlikely that participants knew the path because the experiments were 
organized at (geographical) different places. 
– 9 – shall be explained briefly. By using the following values of the five parameters, the 
binomial process can be described as shown in Figure 2. 
– 10 –  
Parameters of the binomial process   Values 
1 v   1,000 
p  60% 
q  40% 
u  1.2 
d  0.8 
Please insert Figure 2 around here 
In period 2 there are two possible values for the fundamental value: it can increase 
or decrease. If it increases, it changes from v  to vv  
with a probability of  . However, if the fundamental value decreases it changes 
from   to   for what the probability amounts to 
. Now randomly either event “up” or “down” takes place. On the basis of 
the resulting (realized or drawn) fundamental value v , two different values are possible 




21 1,000 1.2 1,200 u u = ⋅ = ⋅ =
60% p =
21
d vv = ⋅ 1 1,000 v =
1 pq ==
1,000 0.8 d = ⋅ =
% 4 0
                                              
−
The role of the fundamental value in these experiments is twofold. On the one hand, 
it is used for the valuation of the portfolios of the participants. On the other hand, the 
participants get information about the fundamental value by its expected value of the 
next period:  . This information was given to the participants 
at the beginning of every trading period. Before the beginning of the first trading period 
participants got the parameter values of the binomial process, too. Thus, not only the 
entire illustration of Figure  2 was comprehensible but also  , i.e. the expected 
value of the fundamental value of the 17
1 E( ) tt t t v puv qdv + = ⋅⋅ + ⋅⋅
T
(17 ) ) 1 . 0 4 t
t vv − = ⋅
E( ) tT v
T
th period (v ), was determinable for each 
investor. The remuneration of the participants depended on v  (see below). The 







5 However, the design of an long-living asset and 16 consecutive trading periods impedes 
learning processes, on principle, since no stationary decisional situation is granted. A 
theoretical consideration on the structure of a participant’s rational calculation and on the 
– 11 – Considering the incentive structure, i.e. the payment on the last fundamental value, 
our experiments have the property that the discovery of the path within the binomial 
tree illustrates the worthiness of the stocks relative to investors’ reference points. Since 
consecutive rises on the path reduce the probability that a low prior level is reached 
again, stock owners should be least eager to sell. Similarly, if the path reaches a high 
level (e.g. period 9 or 11 in Figure 2) the probability that a high-level purchase price is 
recovered during the remaining periods is quite low, and the investor should be eager to 
sell the stock. Thus, a disposition effect is clearly a mistake in this setting. 
Each subject was endowed with 50 stocks and 35,000 currency units.6 Short selling 
and borrowing was allowed up to the initial endowment. The subjects were rewarded 
depending on their success which was measured by their final holdings (cash or debts 
plus portfolio valued with v ). Using this kind of remuneration, all participants knew 
that a liquidation of their shares at the end of the experiment was not necessary. The 
final holding was transformed from currency units into Euro by a pre-known divisor. 
The average payoff was 17.2 € (median: 16.2 € with a range from 5.5 € to 48.8 € 
T
7). The 
average time demanded for one experiment was approximately three hours. 
The experiments were conducted with graduate students of the University of Hagen 
and the Bamberg University. All participants had basic knowledge on financial markets 
and were well-trained statistically. Each subject took part only once.8 All participants 
received a set of written instructions at least two weeks before the experiment started 
(available from the authors). All questions were answered in this pre-period. 
3.2 Trading  mechanisms 
Our experiments were run as computerized market experiments. In each of the 
experiments between 12 and 18 investors formed the market and 16 trading periods 
were executed. In every market one asset was traded. The following table shows the 
                                                                                                                                                
E( ) tT v
size of the market-clearing price is only to indicate under the assumption of risk neutrality. 
 can be interpreted as an asset value of a risk-neutral investor. 
6 Only market makers were endowed differently, cf. Section 3.2). 
7  Losses appeared; nevertheless, there were no negative €-amounts in the final 
settlement of the accounts of the presented experiments, since the initial endowment with 
cash and assets was assumed to be given (donated) and the realized losses did not lead to a 
complete asset deterioration. Basically, the participants had to assume on the basis of the 
written and oral instructions that losses could have been charged to them. 
8 The only exception are the 18 market makers in the dealer market design. They were 
chosen from experienced subjects who already took part in one of the continuous trading 
experiments. 
– 12 – number of experiments and the number subjects for each of the three trading 
mechanisms. 
 
Trading mechanism  No. of experiments No. of subjects 
Call market  6  78 
Continuous trading  6  82 
Dealer market  6  102 
 
The details of these three designs are described in the following. 
In a call market (CM) buy and sell orders for an asset are collected over a fixed period 
of time (trading period) and then executed at the clearing price. There is one call in each 
trading period. 
Similar to the main stock markets the clearing price is determined such that the 
trading volume (number of stocks) is maximized. In the case that not every order can be 
served at the market price the following rationing rule is applied: limited bids exceeding 
the clearing price as well as limited asks below this price are served preferentially. At 
the limit from which a total execution is no longer possible it will be rationed out 
proportionally with the weighted order size. The subjects can submit one limited bid 
and/or ask - within the scope of the given budget restrictions - at every auction. 
Unlimited orders can be mimiked by choosing a high bid or a low ask. After the clearing 
price has been determined, the quote (with rationing information if necessary) and the 
underlying aggregated and anonymized orders are announced to the participants. In 
case of order execution the participants receive an execution notice. 
In  continuous trading (CT) investors can enter new orders at any time during a 
trading period. There are no restrictions concerning the limit of a new order9 or the 
number of orders. Order execution follows price and time priority. The following 
information from the electronic trading system is available to the subjects: the currently 
best bid and ask, the order book of the period (anonymous), the subject’s orders in the 
period, the subject’s current position in cash and stocks, and the prior transaction 
prices and volumes in the period. This list is also anonymous, i.e. the subjects involved 
                                                
9 The only restrictions are based on the existing orders of an investor. Subjects are forced 
to keep a spread in their orders, i.e. their lowest non-executed ask has to be higher than 
their highest non-executed bid. 
– 13 – in the transactions cannot be identified by the other traders in the market. To submit a 
new order subjects have to enter the number of stocks and a bid or ask. As long as an 
order has not been executed the subject can cancel her order. If the new order can be 
matched with existing orders in the order book the transaction takes place. If not, the 
order is added to the order book. 
There are three market makers in each dealer market (DM). Only these market 
makers are allowed to submit limit orders. The other subjects can only accept the 
prices quoted by the dealers. At any point in time during a period a bid and ask of each 
of the market makers has to be available. The following information from the electronic 
trading system is available to the subjects: the currently best bid and ask, the prior 
bids and asks in the period of each market maker, the subject’s current position in 
cash and stocks, the prior transaction prices and volumes in the period. This list is 
anonymous, i.e. the subjects involved in the transactions cannot be identified by the 
other traders in the market. To accept an order the subjects have to name the market 
maker and enter the corresponding bid or ask and the number of shares. The 
maximum number of stocks in a single transaction is set to ten. Immediately after a 
transaction the dealer involved in the transaction has to confirm the existing bid and 
ask or has to enter a new quote. The market makers receive the same information as 
the others. The initial endowment of the market makers is higher than that of the other 
traders. They are endowed with 100 shares and 70,000 currency units. Short selling 
and borrowing was allowed again up to their initial endowment. 
4 Hypotheses 
Two main aspects are focussed in our research: informational efficiency and liquidity 
under different trading mechanisms. 
Regarding to the previous theoretical, empirical and experimental research, 
particularly in a symmetric information environment, we expect markets with 
continuous trading (CT) to be the most efficient. Two aspects support this view. Firstly, 
this mechanism allows subjects to trade assets in “quasi-continuous” time. Secondly, 
trades can follow each other in a fast pace. These two conditions ensure a quick and 
thorough incorporation of (new) information into prices. Call markets (CM) offer much 
less ideal conditions to the subjects and should therefore also be less efficient. 
Dealer markets (DM) seem to be, concerning the trading conditions for the subjects, 
somewhere inbetween CT and CM. But although trading can take place more often 
– 14 – than in CM, the fact that the market makers are involved in every single transaction 
should significantly lower the speed of aggregation of new information.  
With these results in mind, our working hypotheses are the following: 
Hypothesis Tm.Inf1: 
Continuous trading (CT) is the trading mechanism with the highest 
informational efficiency. 
Hypothesis Tm.Inf2: 
Dealer market (DM) is the trading mechanism with the lowest informational 
efficiency. 
The above mentioned reasons for higher efficiency in CT still hold true when looking 
at the liquidity. We therefore expect CT to offer the highest liquidity to subjects. At the 
other end of the range there should be CM, due to offering only limited possibilities to 
the subjects to trade actively, i. e. fast and often. This is equivalent to the previous 
experimental research with a common-value design (see section 2) which suggests a 
weak superiority of dealer markets. 
Consequently, our working hypotheses are:  
Hypothesis Tm.Liq1: 
Continuous trading (CT) is the trading mechanism with the highest liquidity. 
Hypothesis Tm.Liq2: 
Call market (CM) is the trading mechanism with the lowest liquidity. 
5 Results 
5.1  Aggregation of information 
The implemented information structure and payment system is based on an 
investment behavior that is oriented on the binomial tree. Every realization (“draw”) 
means an adjustment to the fundamental value that is decisive for the later payoff  . 
According to this, the measurement of the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), which is 
common in literature, is used in a standardized form (with medians, cf. table 1.1) as a 
T v
– 15 – measure of the quality of aggregation (cf. e.  g. Friedman 1993a, Schiereck 1997 
concerning the use in stock market experiments). The standardization which 
guarantees a comparability of individual trading periods and complete experiments 
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Table  1.1 presents the total results, table  1.2 describes the detailed results for each 
data point (single markets). 
Please insert table 1.1 and 1.2 around here 
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Results are similar to the results presented in this paper. Please note that for CM, RMSE 
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Overall, the levels of informational efficiency between the three trading mechanisms 
seem to be quite similar. 
CT is the most efficient environment (25.9%). CM holds the second place (27.5%) and 
DM shows the lowest informational efficiency (30.2%). This holds true if we look at the 
single data points except for the first one for the comparison of CM and DM (see table 
1.2). 
So, hypothesis Tm.Inf1 and hypothesis Tm.Inf2 cannot be rejected. But applying the 
usually non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test the differences are not significant on a 




Level of significance 
(Wilcoxon rank sum 
test) 
CT ↔  CM  29.44% 
CT ↔  DM  12.01% 
 
5.2 Liquidity 
For the calculation of the measure for liquidity, the bid-ask spread in standardized form 
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For call markets (subtype 2aa in figure 1) Friedman (1993a) formulates roughly the 
bid-ask spread as the difference between the particularly best rejected (not executed) 
bid and the particularly best rejected ask. We calculate the spreads in CM this way11 
(i.e.  ,, ,
rej
itj tj s Bid = − ). This concept is based on the consideration that an additional 
bid reaching the market would be executed at exactly the price which is carried by the 
lowest limited and not executed ask. The same is valid for an additionally executed ask.  
 
Table  2.1 shows the descriptive results, table  2.2 the detailed results for each data 
point (single markets). 
Please insert table 2.1 and 2.2 around here 
Hypothesis Tm.Liq1 cannot be rejected: The CT spreads are the smallest, CT is the most 




Level of significance 
(Wilcoxon rank sum 
test) 
CT ↔  CM  0.11% 
CT ↔  DM  0.76% 
 
 
But it is quite interesting to see that the most illiquid trading mechanism is DM 
(9.3%) and not CM (6.1%). Hence, Hypothesis Tm.Liq2 has to be rejected. This holds 
true for the single markets (table 2.2) except of the first two data points. 
For the subjects, the DM mechanism is more related to CT than it is to CM. 
Therefore our results concerning the illiquidity of the DM mechanism have to be 
                              
11 Cf. Heilmann/Läger/Oehler 2000a, 368–369, for detailed discussion of the use of the 
implicit spread in call markets. 
– 18 – explained by the behavior of the market makers rather than of the subjects. The 
spreads are set by the market makers and they coherently tried to maximize their 
profits per transaction (“high-margin strategy”) by setting wide spreads. They did not 
follow a strategy to lower the spreads in order to increase overall profits due to a higher 
turnover.  
The results for DM are similar to the results reported by Theissen who documents 
12%.12 But his results reported for CM and CT are different. There, clearly CM is the 
most liquid mechanism (1.8%) whereas CT is only number two (4.7%). Possible 
explanations for the different results lie in the chosen design. Theissen uses an 
stationary-replication design (see above section 2) which does not consider any problem 
of portfolio changes over time and other time-dependent decisions of investors. 
Additionally, the quite complex information structure may let to some complications in 
understanding the experimental procedures. The most convincing reason for the 
differing results in both studies is the fact that Theissen induces a strong asymmetric 
information distribution (see above section 2) whereas we use a symmetric approach. 
Corresponding to the previous theoretical, empirical and experimental research both 
results support the hints from the findings there. Under an (strong) asymmetric 
environment call markets outperform continuous trading and within a symmetric 
information environment continuous auctions show superiority. 
6  Summary and conclusion 
This study reports the results of 18 experimental asset markets. The experiments are 
done to compare three principal trading mechanisms which are focused in financial 
markets literature with both a theoretical and a empirical perspective. The information 
structure and the payment system that was implemented in the environment allow us 
to analyze both success factors in international competition of stock exchanges, the 
informational efficiency and the liquidity of the three fundamental market structures.  
Corresponding to the theoretical research and to field studies, the informational 
efficiency of continuous auctions shows a weak superiority to call markets and a 
stronger performance in comparison to dealer markets.  
Regarding to the second criterion, the liquidity, continuous trading offers 
substantially higher liquidity compared to dealer markets and call markets. Dealer 
                                                
12 Cf. Theissen 1999, p. 251. He also used ARS to measure liquidity. 
– 19 – markets perform worst. These findings are equivalent to observations in reality and 
central theoretical proposals. 
The used market designs delivered a richness of data both for further studies on the 
aggregate level as well as for research on the individual level. Among others, there are 
two promising tracks for future work with our stock exchanges in the laboratory. 
Firstly, the comparison of the trading mechanisms was enriched by the introduction of 
some information privileges. A series of experiments, similar to the markets presented 
here, was conducted with insiders. The information privilege consists of the fact that 
these subjects get the new information one period earlier than all other traders. First 
results indicate a tendency of call markets to widen the bid-ask spread in order to avoid 
disadvantages from adverse selection.  
Secondly, the market experiments shall be used in further analyses in the sense of 
the behavioral-finance paradigm (cf. Oehler 2000c) for the explanation of the results in 
the aggregate. It still has to be clarified whether individual participants or groups reveal 
intentionally or unintentionally their trading strategies through their orders and what 
they reach with it. First results indicate that e. g. uninformed traders want to sell an 
asset very quickly compared to a rational behavior when its price has risen recently. On 
the other hand, they do not want to sell an asset over a long period of time when its 
price has sunk before. This is an indication for the disposition effect (cf. 
Heilmann/Läger/Oehler 2000b). In contrast to theoretical considerations, this 
phenomenon does not lead to a close-down of the whole market caused by a reluctance 
to trade. The market participants rather seem either to use different reference points in 
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Figure 1: Main designs of financial markets 
 
 
  Main designs of financial markets 
 
 
  Price intermediation/  1 Dealer Market  2 Auction Market 
  order privilege  (quote driven)  (order driven) 
 
 
  Access intermediation/  1a Multi-  1b Dealer-  2a Open  2b Agency 




  Price intensity  2aa Batch  2ab Continuous 
   Trading  Trading 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 1.1: Results on information aggregation – overview 
The table shows the results of the RMSE measure on the aggregation of information for 
the three market environments: CM, CT, and DM. 
For interpretation: the best value (highest efficiency) is reached when the measure’s 
value amounts to 0%. It is valid13:  0,5() j RM .  SE RMSE ξ =
We use medians instead of means in the averaging procedure to give not too much 
weight to outliers (cf. Nöth 1998). Additionally, the Wilcoxon rank sum test uses this 
measure. Results calculated with the mean are quite similar. 
 
 Trading  mechanism 
 CM  CT  DM 




Table 1.2: Results on information aggregation – details 
The table shows the results of the RMSE measure on the aggregation of information for 
the three market environments: CM, CT, and DM. 





RMSEj (j = 1 … 6) 
CM    24.2% 24.4% 26.0% 29.6% 30.9% 33.3%
CT    21.5% 24.3% 24.8% 26.9% 28.8% 32.3%
DM    14.6% 28.5% 29.2% 31.1% 35.5% 35.5%
Standardized 
                                                
13 For the definition of RMSEj see above, this section. 
– 28 – Table 2.1: Results on liquidity – overview 
The table shows the results of the bid-ask-spread as the liquidity measure for the three 
trading mechanisms (averaged relative spread on the basis of E( ): CT, CM, and DM.  ) tT v
It is valid14:  0,5() j ARS ARS ξ =  
We use medians to give not too much weight to outliers (cf. Nöth 1998). Additionally, 
the Wilcoxon rank sum test uses this measure. Results calculated with means are quite 
similar. 
 
 Trading  mechanism 
 CM  CT  DM 




Table 2.2: Results on liquidity – details 
The table shows the results of the bid-ask-spread as the liquidity measure for the three 
trading mechanisms (averaged relative spread on the basis of Et(Vt)): CM, CT, and DM. 





ARSj (j = 1 … 6) 
CM   5.0%  5.5% 5.6%  6.7% 7.0%  9.6% 
CT   2.1%  2.1% 2.3%  2.6% 3.0%  3.6% 




                                                
14 For the definition of ARSj see above, this section. 
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